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ABSTRACT
Background: The presence of corruption in State institutions and broader society presents
a significant obstacle to the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health. The Universal Periodic Review, a Member State-led peer review system administered
by the Human Rights Council, is a core tool of human rights, including the right to health
accountability. This paper builds on existing research to examine processes that support State
engagement on the issue of corruption. We identify opportunities for States to use the
Universal Periodic Review to support anti-corruption, transparency and accountability to
control corruption in the health-care sector.
Objectives: This paper focuses on health sector how human rights mechanisms, and parti-
cularly the Universal Periodic Review, can be a tool for greater accountability for the right to
health for corruption in the health sector.
Methods: The research team applied qualitative content analysis methods to analyze all 135
Universal Periodic Review documents produced during 2018 in order to analyze how human
rights mechanisms address the impact of corruption on the realization of the right to health.
Results: Although health rights violations are often addressed within human rights mechan-
isms such as the UPR, corruption remains under-addressed, suggesting that there are gaps in
understanding how corruption can seriously undermine the right to health.
Conclusion: Human rights mechanisms should drive greater attention to the importance of
addressing corruption in health. In order to make the UPR more effective, this paper suggests
that there is a need to generate more awareness of corruption-based violations of the right to
health in order to promote greater health accountabilityPractical tools such as strategic
litigation and social audits can also contribute to creating greater transparency and account-
ability in dealing with corruption.
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Background
The World Health Organization (WHO)
Constitution defines the right to health as the right
to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental well-being [1]. The right to health is a legally-
binding obligation, enshrined in international trea-
ties, including the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), and the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families. These treaties
require States to respect, protect and fulfil the right
to health, complementing and enhancing regional
human rights treaties and domestic obligations.
Corruption is generally defined as the ‘misuse of
public power for private gain’ [2]. Corruption can
devastate good governance, the rule of law, develop-
ment, and the equitable enjoyment of all human
rights; notably, the right to health. In health, corrup-
tion can take many forms, as described by Vian and
Crable in the International Encyclopedia of Public
Health (Table 1) [3]. Corruption is often divided
into ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption, with the former
referring to acts at a high level of government, dis-
torting centralized policy, and the latter referring to
smaller-scale corruption involving low and mid-level
public officials [2]. Other distinctions are made
between political and institutional corruption: politi-
cal corruption refers to an act (such as the manipula-
tion of policies and procedures) carried out by
political decision-makers, whereas institutional cor-
ruption refers to the exploitation of institutional posi-
tions to influence processes and actions within
institutions, leading to behavior which becomes nor-
malized within the institution itself [2]. Corruption in
health can be widespread (Table 1). Though research
on the impact of corruption on specific health out-
comes is limited, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
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right to health suggests that States with higher levels
of corruption have a higher prevalence of poor
health, including higher levels of infant and child
mortality [4,5]. Furthermore, where vulnerabilities
intersect – for instance, women in rural areas – the
effect of corruption upon the provision of health may
intensify [6]. While the focus of this research is cor-
ruption within the public sector, private sector rami-
fications are acknowledged, particularly in light of
many models of healthcare service provision.
In order to achieve the meaningful realization of
the right to health, trillions of dollars are spent
Table 1. Types of corruption in the health sector [3].
Area of process Types of corruption and problems Results
Construction and
rehabilitation of health
facilities
● Bribes, kickbacks and political considerations influ-
encing the contracting process
● Contractors fail to perform and are not held
accountable
● High-cost, low-quality facilities and construction work.
Construction investments influences by bribes may also
lead to further waste if recurrent costs to operate
facilities are inadequately financed
● Location of facilities that does not correspond to need,
resulting in inequities in access
● Biased distribution of infrastructure favoring urban- and
elite-focused services, high technology
Purchase of equipment and
supplies including drugs
● Bribes, kickbacks and political considerations influ-
ence specifications and winners of bids
● Collusion or bid rigging during procurement
● Lack of incentives to choose low-cost and high-
quality suppliers
● Unethical drug promotion
● Suppliers fail to deliver and are not held accountable
● High-cost, inappropriate, or duplicative drugs and
equipment
● Irrational prescribing
● Substandard equipment and drugs
● Inequities due to inadequate funds left to provide for all
needs
Distribution and use of
drugs and supplies in
service delivery
● Theft (for personal use) or diversion (for private
sector resale) of drugs and supplies at storage and
distribution points
● Sale of drugs or supplies that were supposed to be
free
● Lower utilization
● Patients do not get proper treatment
● Patients must make informal payments to obtain drugs
● Interruption of treatment or incomplete treatment,
leading to the development of antimicrobial resistance
Regulation of quality in
products, services,
facilities and
professionals
● Bribes to speed process or gain approval for drug
registration, drug quality inspection, or certification
of good manufacturing practices
● Bribes or political considerations influence results of
inspections or suppress findings
● Biased application of sanitary regulations for restau-
rants, food production and cosmetics
● Biased application of accreditation, certification, or
licensing procedures and standards
● Subtherapeutic or fake drugs allowed on the market
● Marginal suppliers are allowed to continue participating
in bids, getting government work
● Increased incidence of food poisoning
● Spread of infectious and communicable diseases
● Poor-quality facilities continue to function
● Incompetent or fake professionals continue to practice
Human resources
management
● Bribes to gain place in medical school or other
training
● Bribed to obtain passing grades
● Political influence, nepotism in selection of candi-
dates for training opportunities or positions
● Bribes or regular payoffs to obtain/maintain position
in government health services or medical facilities
● Incompetent professionals practicing medicine or
working in health professions
● Loss of faith and freedom due to unfair system
● Poor resource allocation decisions due to inaccurate
health expenditure data (doesn’t reflect payoffs to
superiors, effectively a tax on salaries)
● Increased informal payments as health workers seek to
finance required pay-offs to keep their job
● Violation of individual rights
● Patients who receive unnecessary or harmful treatment
Medical research ● Pseudo trials funded by drug companies that are
really designed for marketing purposes
● Misunderstanding of informed consent and other
issues of adequate standards in developing countries
● Violation of individual rights
● Biases and inequities in research● Patients who receive unnecessary or harmful treatment
Financial management ● Embezzlement of budget allocation
● Theft of user fee revenue
● False recording of revenue to inflate or obscure
financial position from stockholder or analysts
(affects private health firms)
● Billing or reimbursement fraud
● Reduced availability of public health programs and
government medical services
● Lower quality of care
● Bankruptcy and loss of entrusted resources
● Loss of state dollars to fraud
Service delivery ● Doctors use public facilities and equipment to see
private patients
● Diversion of patients to private practice or privately
owned ancillary services
● Utilization that is not medically indicated, in order to
maximize income
● Withholding of care that is medically indicated (to
solicit bribes)
● Absenteeism and shirking
● Informal payments required from patients for ser-
vices that were supposed to be free of charge
● Government loses value of investments without ade-
quate compensation
● Employees are not available to serve patients, leading to
a lower volume of services and unmet needs, and higher
unit costs for health services actually delivered
● Reduced utilization of services by patients who cannot
pay
● Impoverishment as citizens borrow or sell assets to pay
for health care
● Loss of citizen faith in government
From Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries: Strategies and Analysis, edited by Bertram I. Spector. Copyright © 2005 by Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Inc. Used with permission of the publisher.
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annually, of which an estimated 10-25% is lost
through corruption, preventing people from enjoying
their right to health [7]. Anti-corruption,
Transparency and Accountability (ACTA) measures
in health systems are increasingly recognized as cen-
tral components for health systems strengthening and
upholding the right to health. Without realizing the
ACTA measures, resources meant to deliver on
health can go waste, thus compromising human
lives [8]. States’ obligation to respect, protect and
fulfil the right requires addressing corruption where
it interferes with citizens’ enjoyment of health. States
are legally bound to design and implement ACTA
measures under the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC). Whilst State parties
bear the ultimate responsibility, they are not the only
actors with responsibilities to realize the right to
health – private actors must respect human rights,
ensuring that they comply with national laws and
regulations, including regarding corruption [9,10].
Many scholars have called for a human rights
response to corruption [11–13] and have identified
a causal relationship between corruption and viola-
tions of the right to health [4,14]. However, the link
between corruption and human rights violations is
bidirectional: human rights violations and deficits
create opportunities for corruption, and corruption
results in human rights violations. Lack of participa-
tion and transparency, and violations of the right to
a fair trial, the right to an effective remedy, and the
right to information, among others, create situations
where corruption is enabled, and may become nor-
mative within society [11,12].
Corruption has a high impact on human develop-
ment; its broad effects include inappropriate legisla-
tion, policy, clinical practices and priorities; denied or
delayed access to healthcare; and the loss of trust in
facilities, personnel and governance. The specific
costs of corruption are difficult to quantify; however,
the negative impact on the right to health generally,
as well as on the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) are clear [15]. Notably, Goal 16 requires
States to commit to ACTA measures through sub-
stantial reduction of corruption and bribery in all
forms by 2030.
The UN started to formally recognize corruption
as a global problem in 2000 by adopting resolution
55/61, and then repeated resolutions in 2001, 2002,
which resulted in adoption of the first ever interna-
tional treaty on corruption, the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003.
In recent years, several United Nations human rights
mechanisms have acknowledged the negative impacts
of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights. In
addition to the work of the UN Special Rapporteur
on the right to health, the UN Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights made 75
explicit references to corruption in their recommen-
dations to States as a barrier to the fulfilment of rights
protected under the Covenant including the right to
health [see, for example, 16–26]. The Committee on
the Rights of the Child has made 102 explicit refer-
ences to corruption (the majority very general) as an
impediment to the realization of rights protected
within the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
with some explicit references to corruption in the
health sector or as an impediment to health-related
rights [27–30]. Similarly, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and
the Committee on Migrant Workers have raised the
issue of corruption in relation to violence, a harmful
and important determinant of health [31,32].
In 2003, the former Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
appointed a Special Rapporteur on corruption and
its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights. In
her reports, she highlighted the general effects of
corruption on civil and political rights, as well as
economic, social and cultural rights [33–36]. She
made specific reference to broad, negative ramifica-
tions to health and its underlying determinants [34
(Paragraphs 6, 13, and 21(d)), 35 (Paragraphs 11, 12,
34, 35 and 40)]. The Advisory Committee on the
negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of
human rights succeeded the Special Rapporteur in the
Human Rights Council, and their final report in 2015
highlighted the relationship between corruption and
violations of the right to health [36]. The committee
established that linking corruption and human rights
creates new opportunities for monitoring and litiga-
tion [36].
In 2017, the Human Rights Council adopted
a resolution which outlined the frameworks and
mechanisms available to address corruption’s nega-
tive impact on human rights [37]. The resolution
reminded States of their obligations and commit-
ments, underlined stakeholder cooperation and
coordination at national, regional and international
levels, and invited the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and
UNODC to coordinate their work to deepen under-
standing of the nexus between corruption and
human rights, encouraging the Human Rights
Council mechanisms to consider the issue of corrup-
tion within the respective mandates. There is
a growing literature on the role and effectiveness
of human rights mechanisms in promoting human
rights and protecting the rights of citizens, specifi-
cally the right to health [38–40]. For instance,
Gensen reviewed 169 research publications which
illustrated the impact of National Human Rights
Institutions [41]. However, these studies did not
focus on how human rights mechanisms can be
used to deal with corruption in the health sector.
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Objectives
Building on the relationship between corruption in
the health sector and the right to health, this article
focuses on how human rights mechanisms, particu-
larly the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), can be
used as tools for holding State and non-State actors
accountable for the impact of corruption on the right
to health.
Method
The UPR was established by General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 to review the human rights records
of all UN Member States. The UPR is a State-driven
process, led by the Human Rights Council (HRC). It
provides the opportunity for each State to declare
what actions they have taken to fulfil human rights
obligations in their respective states. Acting as the
only universal mechanism of this type, the UPR
reviews human rights records of each state every
four and a half years. Review takes place in three
sessions every year, each session taking 2 weeks and
reviewing up to 16 States, thus completing 192 states
in one cycle. To date, two cycles of the UPR (2008–-
2011, sessions 1–12, and 2012–2016, sessions 13 to
26) have been completed and the third one is under-
way (2017–2021, sessions 14–40). The goal is to
ensure that States are accountable for human rights
violations. We were interested in analyzing whether
there was any evidence of States curbing corruption
in the health sector and recognizing it as a human
rights violation.
The UPR process has four phases: (i) gathering
and collating information; (ii) ‘interactive dialogue’
in the UPR Working Group, leading to an Outcome
Report; (iii) final adoption of the Outcome Report,
including recommendations to the reviewed state,
which may be accepted, partially accepted, noted,
or taken under further consideration; and (iv) follow
up to the review process. The information gathered
during phase I consists of a report submitted by the
State under review (the ‘national report’); data
gleaned from the reports of independent human
rights experts and groups, such as the Special
Procedures, human rights treaty bodies, and other
UN entities; and information from other stake-
holders, including national human rights institutions
and non-governmental organizations. These data
sources are then reviewed during phase II, through
an interactive discussion between the State under
review and other UN Member States. During this
discussion, any UN Member State can pose ques-
tions, comments and/or make recommendations to
the States under review. Following the review,
a report is prepared (outcome report) that provides
a summary of the actual discussion. In phase III the
state under review can adopt the Outcome Report,
which includes accepting, partially accepting, noting,
or taking under further consideration the recom-
mendations; and the fourth phase is concerned
with the follow-up to the review during next session,
where the state is required to submit a report about
the actions that they have taken as a result of the
recommendations.
In January 2018, the 29th session of the UPR was
completed with 14 states (Bahamas, Barbados,
Botswana, Burundi, France, Israel, Lichtenstein,
Luxembourg, Mali, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia,
Tonga and UAE). The dataset for this analysis con-
sisted of the 142 documents (1196 pages) covering
these 14 states. We chose this session because it was
the most recent data available at the time of analysis.
Although a non-random sample of countries, this
dataset can give insight into the most-recent types
of issues and concerns raised.
The documents were downloaded from the respec-
tive states’ UPR websites, and included the National
Report; the Compilation of UN Information (based on
information contained in the reports of the Special
Procedures, human rights treaty bodies like the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[CESCR], and other UN entities); the Annex to the
Compilation; the Summary of Stakeholders’
Information; Questions submitted in advance and
Addenda; and the Outcome of the Review, as well as
any Addenda [42]. We searched all 142 documents for
any text relating to corruption, using the search term
‘corruption’ and found a total of 206 occurrences. We
read the paragraph containing each of these occur-
rences and looked to see whether each of these refer-
ences to health corruption was translated into a formal
recommendation in the Outcome Report. If it was, we
extracted and summarized this recommendation.
We further analyzed all 2632 UPR recommenda-
tions made for all 14 countries in order to identify
which health-related issues were mentioned and the
type of actions demanded from the states under
review. We classified each recommendation using
content analysis by deductive coding, using the 21
codes given in the report on advancing the right to
health through the universal periodic review prepared
by the WHO and Human Rights Centre Clinic,
University of Essex [43]. We used these 21 pre-
existing codes to classify recommendations based on
health issues highlighted [43], and also categorized
the recommendations into six different types (see
Table 2).
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We then transferred all the recommendations to
an excel spreadsheet. Each recommendation was con-
sidered as a unit of analysis for the purpose of assign-
ing codes and to classify into different categories. It
was possible for one recommendation to be assigned
multiple codes, based on the issues highlighted in the
contents of that recommendation. Once the codes
were assigned to each recommendation, we counted
the frequency of each code. We mainly chose this
frequency count approach to facilitate comparison
of the extent to which ‘corruption in health sector’
is discussed relative to the ‘other 21 categories of
health-related topics’. However, to overcome the lim-
itations of the frequency counts and deductive coding
approach, we supplemented the analysis with
a detailed account of corruption-related data in the
UPR documents, and summarized where and in what
context corruption was mentioned.
Methodological limitations
Clearly, a simple search for the single word ‘corrup-
tion’ is a crude means of locating sections of the
reports which address issues relating to corruption.
Frequency counts may give some indication of the
extent to which a report concerns itself with corrup-
tion, but this is only a very approximate measure.
Frequency counts of health sector corruption relative
to the other health-related issues raised during the
UPR session may, however, give some idea of how
extensively it is being addressed. Given the length of
the combined set of reports, we did not have the
capacity to read for understanding every report.
However, we did read in detail each paragraph in
which the word ‘corruption’ was found, in order to
identify the context in which corruption was being
discussed. We do of course note that there may have
been other relevant paragraphs, not containing the
word ‘corruption’, which might have contained infor-
mation useful to our findings, and which we did not
locate.
It is also important to stress that content analysis
only examines the contents of the UPR documents,
and does not illuminate how these might affect the
actions of countries on corruption later. This would
be an important area for future research, as would
extending our study beyond the sample of 14 coun-
tries examined here. However, this study provides
a cross-section of the latest data to give an insight
into the way the UPR is addressing health sector
corruption relative to other right-to-health related
issues. This information could be useful when review-
ing the role of the UPR process in dealing with
corruption as a human rights issue for a larger sample
of countries.
Results
Despite significant State engagement with the right
to health, our analysis revealed a lack of focus on
how corruption impacts the realization of the right.
For example, of 2632 recommendations made dur-
ing the 29th session, 1168 (44%) were health-
related, but only 2 (0.08%) focused on corruption
in health sector (see Figure 1). Seventeen recom-
mendations (0.65%) were related to corruption in
general (including the health-related corruption
recommendations). France received the most
recommendations, 297 (11.3%) in this session, fol-
lowed by Burundi (237) and UAE (232). Barbados
received the highest proportion of health-related
recommendations, 76.6% (105 out of 137 recom-
mendations made to the country) followed by
Bahamas (69.5%) and Botswana (62.3%). States
mostly made implementation-related recommenda-
tions (41%), followed by recommendations to ratify
international human rights mechanisms (18%), and
recommendations to enact relevant legislation
(22%) (see Figure 2).
We further studied the distribution of specific
health-related issues for all six categories of recom-
mendations (Figure 3) and noted that for the most
common category (implementation), the majority of
recommendations were made for the issue of gender-
based violence and harmful practices (28.8%). The
corruption-related recommendations were mainly
Table 2.
No. Type of recommendations Explanation
1 International human rights mechanisms Covers recommendations that encourage states to ratify international human rights treaties; invite
UN Special Rapporteurs; implement recommendations from treaty bodies’ concluding
observations; implement comments or other relevant documents.
2 Legislation Covers recommendations that approve or call for changes in legislation; changes to the legal
framework; the repeal of certain legal provisions.
3 National funding Covers recommendations to allocate or increase funds to a certain issue that engages the right to
health; the health sector or health services.
4 International cooperation (funding and
technical assistance)
Covers recommendations that engage the international community, assistance, cooperation and
funding, either by encouraging the State under review to seek assistance from other states, or by
requesting the State under review to share its expertise in a particular region.
5 Policies and programmes Covers recommendations concerned with the enforcement or implementation of human rights
through policies, procedures, programmes, services or other facilities.
6 Other Covers recommendations that refer to issues of health but do not fit any of the above categories.
From WHO and Human Rights Centre Clinic, University of Essex (permissions pending).
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demanding implementation of policies and programs
to combat corruption (12, 60%) from the States under
review, followed by legislative changes and improve-
ments (5, 25%) and others (3, 15%) demanding gen-
eral non-specific anti-corruption actions or changes
in training and curriculum of judiciary.
Analysis of ‘corruption’ in the UPR
All the national reports mentioned corruption in
reference to their efforts, progress or achievements
to combat the issue, while the stakeholders’ reports
mentioned it to highlight the concern for corruption
and impunity for four states and to give recommen-
dations mainly to increase transparency to combat
corruption for two countries. The Compilation of
UN Information reported corruption concerns for
only two countries – Romania (high-level corruption
impacting economic, social and cultural rights) and
Montenegro (health sector corruption) – and this was
in the reports of the CESCR, while UNHCR also
commended the anti-corruption efforts of
Liechtenstein. Questions submitted in advance were
mainly for an update of the progress of the states
under review. The interactive dialogue on the
Outcome Report the focus narrowed to only seven
countries. This dialogue consisted mainly on com-
mending, acknowledging or noting the efforts of the
state under review by other countries (three states),
or the states’ responses about their progress (four
states). For instance, for Montenegro, concern was
shown about highly prevalent corrupt practices in
health, education and employment sectors and the
country was asked to take further measures.
A total of 17 corruption-related recommendations
were made for six countries (Table 3). Montenegro
and Romania both received six such recommenda-
tions while Serbia received two. Twelve countries
made these recommendations (France made 3,
Australia, Canada, and the USA each made 2, and
single one by Germany, Norway, Korea, Estonia,
Sweden, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Portugal). Seven
recommendations specifically demanded actions for
corruption in judicial system (introducing and
strengthening judicial reforms); eight recommenda-
tions were general about anti-corruption actions, i.e.,
asking states to implement laws and intensify efforts;
one recommendation was about the need for
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legislation related to private sector corruption, two
recommendations were focusing on combating cor-
ruption in health sector, while one recommendation
demanded rejecting the legislation weakening anti-
corruption efforts. Out of the 17 corruption-related
recommendations made during the UPR session, 15
were supported by the states under review illustrating
that States broadly accept recommendations on cor-
ruption when issued.
Corruption in the health sector
Corruption in the health sector was discussed in the
UPR process for two States of the 14 reviewed (Romania
and Montenegro) but was included in the recommen-
dations of only one State, Romania in recommenda-
tions made by France and Korea. The CESCR raised
concerns over corruption in the health sector, mainly in
the form of informal user fees (Romania and
Montenegro) and procurement (Montenegro).
However, the resulting recommendation by Korea
focused mainly on general health-sector corruption:
‘take measures to combat corruption in the health sec-
tor’. The CESCR highlighted that corruption adversely
affects the full enjoyment of economic, social and cul-
tural rights in Romania. The Committee noted low
salaries for civil servants, health personnel and educa-
tors. They expressed concern regarding lenient penal-
ties for corruption – highlighting noted risk factors for
corruption in the sectors. The Special Rapporteur on
extreme poverty called on Romania to fight corruption
in the health sector so that non-official fees were not
collected from patients. These concerns were high-
lighted in the recommendation made by France, ‘ …
Continue to fight corruption in the heath sector, by
taking both criminal action as well as measures to
increase awareness of the negative effects of informal
payments within the medical profession’.
Health sector corruption was also discussed in the
case of Montenegro. The CESCR expressed concerns
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Table 3. Discussion of corruption in the UPR reports.
Country
National
report
Compilation of
UN information
Summary of
stakeholders
submissions
Questions
submitted in
advance
Outcome report
Summary of
national
report
Interactive
dialogue Recommendations
Bahamas X - - - X - -
Barbados X - - - X - X
Botswana X - - - - - -
Burundi X - X - - X X
France - - - - - - -
Israel - - - - - - -
Liechtenstein X X X - - - X
Luxembourg - - - X - X -
Mali X - X - - - -
Montenegro X X X X X X X
Romania X X - X - X X
Serbia X - X - X X X
Tonga X - X - - - -
UAE X - - - - - -
Total 11 3 6 3 4 5 6
X indicates a mention of corruption for one or more times in the relevant reports (sections).
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over informal payments provided by patients to health-
care practitioners. The same committee also highlighted
the issue of insufficient oversight of public procurement
in the health-care sector. Australia also raised concerns
about health-sector corruption in Montenegro, but it
did not come up in the recommendations. The corrup-
tion-related recommendations for Montenegro were
general ‘… Address corruption in the public sector
and ensure the proper use of public authority in the
managing and disposing of public property’.
Corruption, in general, was discussed in relation to
six countries (Barbados, Burundi, Liechtenstein,
Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia), resulting in
a total of 15 recommendations (Table 4). In addition,
human rights concerns in relation to acts or omis-
sions of the private sector were discussed during the
interactive dialogue for seven countries, resulting in
a total of 16 recommendations. However, we contend
that these low numbers, in comparison to the num-
bers of recommendations made regarding other cate-
gories of violations of the right to health, indicate
a missed opportunity in addressing the issue of cor-
ruption in health, and its relationship to the right to
health.
Discussion
Our analysis suggests that the UPR mechanism is
useful for identifying a variety of health-related
human rights issues; however, it has been used
only modestly to identify corruption in the health
sector as a human rights concern. For example, of
2632 recommendations made during the 29th ses-
sion, 1168 (44%) were health-related, but only 2
(0.08%) were focused on corruption in the health
sector (see Figure 1). Furthermore, only 17 recom-
mendations (0.65%) were related to corruption in
general (including the health-related corruption
recommendations). We found that even where
recommendations were made, they were very gen-
eral exhortations to ‘fight corruption.’ While this
shows some consciousness of the problem, vague
or general recommendations do not help target
stakeholder action. It is important, therefore, to
educate States and stakeholders about the ways
in which the UPR review process can highlight
corruption risks as a barrier to the right to health,
and to identify more specific recommendations
that might be helpful. For instance, the UPR pro-
cess could be more specific and explicitly ask
countries to make the procurement process open,
transparent and free of corruption [44]. In the
subsequent review, States would then submit spe-
cific measures they have taken in response. More
state sensitization on this kind of specificity from
the Special Rapporteur on the right to health
would be welcome.
As we highlighted in the 'Background' section,
the Special Rapporteur’s report is welcome in
highlighting these linkages, and we recommend
that the Special Rapporteur and other human
rights bodies go further in raising the prominence
of this issue by providing detailed guidance for
Human rights bodies and States about this pro-
cess. Additionally, specific guidance needs to be
given to State parties and other stakeholders in
order to highlight that corruption causes specific
risks within the health sector and this undermines
the realization of the right to health. Other human
rights tools such as social audits, increased civil
society litigation and strategic litigation can also
strengthen accountability mechanisms within the
UPR process as we discuss below.
Social audits
Social audits are ways of measuring, understand-
ing, reporting and ultimately improving an orga-
nization’s social and ethical performance. These
audits create greater accountability in the health
sector by enabling stakeholders, including
intended beneficiaries, to participate in improving
health planning and delivery [44]. Social audits
can review State records, determining whether
reported expenditures reflect reality, actualizing
the Alma-Ata Declaration’s principle of participa-
tory healthcare, and instituting grass roots
accountability to counter the loss of faith in gov-
ernance stemming from corruption. Initiatives
that try to improve transparency, such as the
WHO list of Medicine Price Information Sources
and the Pharmaceutical System Transparency and
Accountability Assessment Tool, can further
strengthen mechanisms at the domestic level.
Table 4. Number of corruption and health-related topics in
the recommendations of the 29th session of the third cycle of
UPR.
Recommendations
Country Total
Health-
related
Corruption in
health sector
Corruption
(General)
1 Bahamas 141 98 0 0
2 Barbados 137 105 0 1
3 Botswana 207 129 0 0
4 Burundi 237 99 0 1
5 France 297 112 0 0
6 Israel 240 51 0 0
7 Liechtenstein 126 40 0 1
8 Luxembourg 149 52 0 0
9 Mali 194 83 0 0
10 Montenegro 169 75 0 6
11 Romania 203 113 2 4
12 Serbia 190 67 0 2
13 Tonga 110 62 0 0
14 UAE 232 82 0 0
Total 2632 1168 2 15
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This may be through providing information
regarding pricing, and institutionalizing good gov-
ernance through capacity building, transparency
and accountability [45]. The UPR mechanism
could integrate social audit information in deter-
mining whether states are complying with their
health obligations in identifying instances of
corruption.
Strengthening civil society
Strong civil society and specialist rights-based orga-
nizations can enable the UPR and other human rights
mechanisms to deal more robustly with corruption.
An engaged civil society can participate in the
accountability process, including the submission of
amicus briefs, shadow reports or other research-
based submissions, engaging in the UPR, monitoring
and evidencing State activities, and making
recommendations.
Strategic litigation
Strategic litigation aims to achieve systemic legisla-
tive change and strengthen human rights through
test cases. This has the advantage of raising public
awareness and the profile of the issue in question.
Strategic Litigation can draw on the UPR mechan-
ism in order to strengthen arguments about a lack
of state accountability for curbing corruption and
the resulting right to health violations. For example,
in the Ugandan Case of Centre for Health Human
Rights and Development and Others V Attorney
General (Constitutional Appeal No 1 of 2013), the
Supreme Court held that the constitutional court
wrongfully dismissed a 2012 petition that argued
that the Ugandan government should be held liable
for failure to provide adequate maternity services.
The two cases involved women who had died in
labor because of absenteeism by health workers
who were engaged in private clinics, and, in one
case, an inability to buy essential medical supplies
required by health-care workers, in contravention
with government guidance [Centre for Health
Human Rights and Ors V AG Const Appeal No 1
of 2013]. A recent Transparency International report
based on data for 64 countries highlighted that
a prevalence of bribery is one of the main causes
of maternal mortality, regardless of how wealthy
a country is and how much it invests in health
[46]. This case led to much tighter supervision of
health workers at the community level, maternal
death audits in order to follow up the cause of
death when women died, and greater community
awareness about governments’ obligations for mater-
nal health [47].
Conclusion
This paper has shown that human rights mechanisms
should drive greater attention to the importance of
addressing corruption in health. Mechanisms such as
the UPR, that are increasingly being widely endorsed
and supported by member States, have significant
potential in addressing corruption in health within
countries, but this remains largely underutilized.
A major constraint facing these mechanisms is the
diversity of issues that are examined, each with differ-
ent root causes and contextual factors. Human rights
mechanisms should incorporate specific guidance and
measures of where corruption is likely to occur, and
effective strategies for prevention. Given the negative
impact of corruption, there is a need to engage with
civil society organizations, so that they can push cor-
ruption in health onto the agenda of human rights
mechanisms. Practical tools, such as strengthening
civil society, strategic litigation and social audits, can
also contribute to creating greater transparency and
accountability in dealing with corruption.
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